Lectures on General Linguistics

Lectures on General Linguistics

Ferdinand
de Saussure

Lecture of  28. October 1910

Brief survey of the history of linguistics

The course will deal with linguistics proper, not with languages
and language. This science has gone through phases with shortcomings. Three
phases
may be distinguished, or three successive approaches adopted
by those who took a language as an object of study. Later on came
a linguistics proper
, aware of its object.

The first of these phases is that of grammar, invented by the
Greeks and carried on unchanged by the French. It never had any philosophical
view of a language as such. That’s more the concern of logic. All traditional
grammar is normative grammar, that is, dominated by a preoccupation with
laying down rules, and distinguishing between a certain allegedly ‚correct‘
language and another, allegedly ‚incorrect‘; which straight away precludes
any broader view of the language phenomenon as a whole.

Later and only at the beginning of the 19th century, if we are talking
of major movements (and leaving out the precursors, the ‚philological‘
school at Alexandria), came 2) the
great philological movement of classical philology, carrying on
down to our own day. In 1777, Friedrich Wolf, as a student, wished to be
enrolled as a philologist. Philology introduced a new principle: the method
of critical examination of texts. The language was just one of the many
objects coming within the sphere of philology, and consequently subjected
to this criticism. Henceforth, language studies were no longer directed
merely towards correcting grammar. The critical principle demanded an examination,
for instance, of the contribution of different periods, thus to some extent
embarking on historical linguistics. Ritschl’s revision of the text of
Plautus may be considered the work of a linguist. In general, the philological
movement opened up countless sources relevant to linguistic issues, treating
them in quite a different spirit from traditional grammar; for instance,
the study of inscriptions and their language. But not yet in the spirit
of linguistics.

A third phase in which this spirit of linguistics is still not
evident: this is the sensational phase of discovering that languages could
be compared with one another; that a bond or relationship existed between
languages often separated geographically by great distances; that, as well
as languages, there were also great language families, in particular the
one which came to be called the Indo-European family.

Surprisingly, there was never a more flawed or absurd idea of what a
language is than during the thirty years that followed this discovery by
Bopp (1816). In fact, from then on scholars engaged in a kind of game of
comparing different Indo-European languages with one another, and eventually
they could not fail to wonder what exactly these connections showed, and
how they should be interpreted in concrete terms. Until nearly 1870, they
played this game without any concern for the conditions affecting the life
of a language.

This very prolific phase, which produced many publications, differs
from its predecessors by focussing attention on a great number of languages
and the relations between them, but, just like its predecessors, has no
linguistic perspective, or at least none which is correct, acceptable and
reasonable. It is purely comparative. You cannot altogether condemn the
more or less hostile attitude of the philological tradition towards the
comparativists, because the latter did not in fact bring any renewal bearing
on the principles themselves, none which in practice immediately opened
up any new horizons, and with which they can clearly be credited. When
was it recognised that comparison is, in short, only a method to employ
when we have no more direct way of ascertaining the facts, and when did
comparative grammar give way to a linguistics which included comparative
grammar and gave it a new direction?

It was mainly the study of the Romance languages which led the IndoEuropeanists
themselves to a more balanced view and afforded a glimpse of what the study
of linguistics was to be in general. Doubtless the growth of Romance studies,
inaugurated by Diehls, was a development of Bopp’s rules for the IndoEuropean
languages. In the Romance sphere, other conditions quickly became apparent;
in the first place, the actual presence of the prototype of each form;
thanks to Latin, which we know, Romance scholars have this prototype in
front of them from the start, whereas for the Indo-European languages we
have to reconstruct hypothetically the prototype of each form. Second,
with the Romance languages it is perfectly possible, at least in certain
periods, to follow the language from century to century through documents,
and so inspect closely what was happening. These two circumstances reduce
the area of conjecture and made Romance linguistics look quite different
from Indo-European linguistics. It must also be said that Germanic studies
to some extent played the same role as well. There the prototype does not
exist, but in the case of Germanic there are long historical periods that
can be followed.

The historical perspective that the Indo-Europeanists lacked, because
they viewed everything on the same level, was indispensable for the Romance
scholars. And the historical perspective revealed how the facts were connected.
Thus it came about that the influence of Romance studies was very salutary.
One of the great defects, from a scholarly point of view, which is common
to philology and the comparative phase is a servile attachment to the letter,
to the written language, or a failure to draw a clear distinction between
what might pertain to the real spoken language and what to its graphic
sign. Hence, it comes about that the literary point of view is more or
less confused with the linguistic point of view, and furthermore, more
concretely, the written word is confused with the spoken word; two superimposed
systems of signs which have nothing to do with each other, the written
and the spoken, are conflated. The linguistics which gradually developed
in this way is a science for which we can take the definition given by
Hatzfeld, Darmstetter and Thomas’s Dictionary: ‚the scientific study
of languages‘
, which is satisfactory, but it is this word scientific
that distinguishes it from all earlier studies.

What does it take: 1) as its subject
matter 2) as its object or task ?

1) a scientific study will take
as its subject matter every kind of variety of human language: it will
not select one period or another for its literary brilliance or for the
renown of the people in question. It will Pay attention to any tongue,
whether obscure or famous, and likewise to any period, giving no preference,
for example, to what is called a classical period‘, but according equal
interest to so-called decadent or archaic periods. Similarly, for any given
period, it will refrain from selecting the most educated language, but
will concern itself at the same time with popular forms more or less in
contrast with the so-called educated or literary language, as well as the
forms of the so-called educated or literary language. Thus linguistics
deals with language of every period and in all the guises it assumes.

Necessarily, it should be pointed out, in order to have documentation
for all periods, as far as possible, linguistics will constantly have to
deal with the written language, and will often have to rely on the insights
of philology in order to take its bearings among these written texts; but
it will always distinguish between the written text and what lies underneath;
treating the former as being only the envelope or external mode of presentation
of its true object, which is solely the spoken language.

2) The business, task or object
of the scientific study of languages will if possible be 1) to trace the
history of all known languages. Naturally this is possible only to a very
limited extent and for very few languages.

In attempting to trace the history of a language, one will very soon
find oneself obliged to trace the history of a language family. Before
Latin, there is a period which Greek and Slavic share in common. So this
involves the history of language families, as and when relevant.

But in the second place 2), and this is very different, it will be necessary
to derive from this history of all the languages themselves laws of the
greatest generality. Linguistics will have to recognise laws operating
universally in language, and in a strictly rational manner, separating
general phenomena from those restricted to one branch of languages or another.
There are more special tasks to add; concerning the relations between linguistics
and various sciences. Some are related by reason of the information and
data they borrow, while others, on the contrary, supply it and assist its
work. It often happens that the respective domains of two sciences are
not obvious on first inspection; in the very first place, what ought to
be mentioned here are the relations between linguistics and psychology
– which are often difficult to demarcate.

It is one of the aims of linguistics to define itself, to recognise
what belongs within its domain. In those cases where it relies upon psychology,
it will do so indirectly, remaining independent.

Once linguistics is conceived in this way, i.e. as concerned with language
in all its manifestations, an object of the broadest possible scope, we
can immediately, so to speak, understand what perhaps was not always clear:
the utility of linguistics, or its claim to be included among those
studies relevant to what is called ‚general culture‘.

As long as the activity of linguists was limited to comparing one language
with another, this general utility cannot have been apparent to most of
the general public, and indeed the study was so specialised that there
was no real reason to suppose it of possible interest to a wider audience.
It is only since linguistics has become more aware of its object of study,
i.e. perceives the whole extent of it, that it is evident that this science
can make a contribution to a range of studies that will be of interest
to almost anyone. It is by no means useless, for instance, to those who
have to deal with texts. It is useful to the historian, among others, to
be able to see the commonest forms of different phenomena, whether phonetic,
morphological or other, and how language lives, carries on and changes
over time. More generally, it is evident that language plays such a considerable
role in human societies, and is a factor of such importance both for the
individual human being and human society, that we cannot suppose that the
study of such a substantial part of human nature should remain simply and
solely the business of a few specialists; everyone, it would seem, is called
upon to form as correct an idea as possible of what this particular aspect
of human behaviour amounts to in general. All the more so inasmuch as really
rational, acceptable ideas about it, the conception that linguistics has
eventually reached, by no means coincides with what at first sight seems
to be the case. There is no sphere in which more fantastic and absurd ideas
have arisen than in the study of languages. Language is an object which
gives rise to all kinds of mirage. Most interesting of all, from a psychological
point of view, are the errors language produces. Everyone, left to his
own devices, forms an idea about what goes on in language which is very
far from the truth.

Thus it is equally legitimate in that respect for linguistics today
to Claim to be able to put many ideas right, to throw light on areas where
the general run of scholars would be very liable to go wrong and make very
serious mistakes.

I have left on one side the question of languages and language in order
to discuss the object of linguistics and its possible utility.


[4 November 1910]

Main sections of the course:

1) Languages 2)
The language 3) The language
faculty and its use by
the individual.

Without for the moment distinguishing terminologically between languages
and language, where do we find the linguistic phenomenon in its concrete,
complete, integral form? That is: where do we find the object we have to
confront? With all its characteristics as yet contained within it and unanalysed?
This is a difficulty which does not arise in many other disciplines – not
having your subject matter there in front of you. It would be a mistake
to believe that this integral, complete object can be grasped by picking
out whatever is most general. The operation of generalisation presupposes
that we have already investigated the object under scrutiny in such a way
as to be able to pronounce upon what its general features are. What is
general in language will not be what we are looking for; that is, the object
immediately given. But nor must we focus on what is only part of it.

Thus, it is clear that the vocal apparatus has an importance which may
monopolise our attention, and when we have studied this articulatory aspect
of languages we shall soon realise that there is a corresponding acoustic
aspect. But even that does not go beyond purely material considerations.
It does not take us as far as the word, the combination of the idea and
the articulatory product; but if we take the combination of the idea and
the vocal sign, we must ask if this is to be studied in the individual
or in a society, a corporate body: we still seem to be left with something
which is incomplete. Proceeding thus, we see that in catching hold of the
language by one end at random we are far from being able to grasp the whole
phenomenon. It may seem, after approaching our study from several angles
simultaneously, that there is no homogeneous entity which is the language,
but only a conglomerate of composite items (articulation of a sound, idea
connected to it) which must be studied piecemeal and cannot be studied
as an integral object.

The solution we can adopt is this:

In every individual there is a faculty which can be called the faculty
of articulated language
. This faculty is available to us in the first
instance in the form of organs, and then by the operations we can perform
with those organs. But it is only a faculty, and it would be a material
impossibility to utilise it in the absence of something else – a language
– which is given to the individual from outside: it is necessary that the
individual should be provided with this facility – with what we call a
language – by the combined effort of his fellows, here we see, incidentally,
perhaps the most accurate way of drawing a distinction between language
and languages. A language is necessarily social: language is not especially
so. The latter can be defined at the level of the individual. It is an
abstract thing and requires the human being for its realisation. This faculty
which exists in individuals might perhaps be compared to others: man has
the faculty of song, for example; perhaps no one would invent a tune unless
the community gave a lead. A language presupposes that all the individual
users possess the organs. By distinguishing between the language and the
faculty of language, we distinguish 1)
what is social from what is individual, 2)
what is essential from what is more or less accidental. As a matter of
fact, we shall see later on that it is the combination of the idea with
a vocal sign which suffices to constitute the whole language. Sound production
– that is what falls within the domain of the faculty of the individual
and is the individual’s responsibility. But it is comparable to the performance
of a musical masterpiece on an instrument; many are capable of playing
the piece of music, but it is entirely independent of these various performances.

The acoustic image linked to an idea – that is what is essential to
the language. It is in the phonetic execution that all the accidental things
occur; for inaccurate repetition of what was given is at the root of that
immense class of facts, phonetic changes, which are a host of accidents.

3) By distinguishing thus between
the language and the faculty of language, we see that the language is what
we may call a ‚product‘: it is a ’social product‘; we have set it
apart from the operation of the vocal apparatus, which is a permanent action.
You can conjure up a very precise idea of this product – and thus set the
language, so to speak, materially in front of you – by focussing on what
is potentially in the brains of a set of individuals (belonging to one
and the same community) even when they are asleep; we can say that in each
of these heads is the whole product that we call the language. We can say
that the object to be studied is the hoard deposited in the brain of each
one of us; doubtless this hoard, in any individual case, will never turn
Out to be absolutely complete. We can say that language always works through
a language‘, without that, it does not exist. The language, in turn, is
quite independent of the individual; it cannot be a creation of the individual-,
it is essentially social; it presupposes the collectivity. Finally, its
only essential feature is the combination of sound and acoustic image with
an idea. (The acoustic image is the impression that remains with us the
latent impression in the brain (D.)). There is no need to conceive it (the
language) as necessarily spoken all the time.

Let us come down to details; let us consider the language as a social
product. Among social products, it is natural to ask whether there is any
other which offers a parallel.

The American linguist Whitney who, about 1870, became very influential
through his book The principles and the life of language, caused
astonishment by comparing languages to social Institutions, saying that
they fell in general into the great class of social institutions. In this,
he was on the right track-, his ideas are in agreement with mine. ‚It is,
in the end, fortuitous,‘ he said, ‚that men made use of the larynx, lips
and tongue in order to speak. They discovered it was more convenient; but
if they had used visual signs, or hand signals, the language would remain
in essence exactly the same: nothing would have changed.‘ This was right,
for he attributed no great importance to execution. Which comes down to
what I was saying: the only change would be the replacement of the acoustic
images I mentioned by visual images. Whitney wanted to eradicate the idea
that in the case of a language we are dealing with a natural faculty; in
fact, social institutions stand opposed to natural institutions.

Nevertheless, you cannot find any social institution that can be set
on a par with a language and is comparable to it. There are very many differences.
The very special place that a language occupies among institutions is undeniable,
but there is much more to be said-, a comparison would tend rather to bring
out the differences. In a general way, institutions such as legal institutions,
or for instance a set ,of rituals, or a ceremony established once and for
all, have many characteristics which make them like languages, and the
changes they undergo over time a.-e very reminiscent of linguistic changes.
But there are enormous differences.

1) No other institution involves
all the individuals all the time; no other is open to all in such a way
that each person participates in it and naturally influences it.

2) Most institutions can be improved,
corrected at certain times, reformed by an act of will, whereas on the
contrary we see that such an initiative is impossible where languages are
concerned, that even academies cannot change by decree the course taken
by the institution we call the language, etc.

Before proceeding further, another idea must be introduced: that of
semiological facts in societies. Let us go back to the language
considered as a product of society at work: it is a set of signs fixed
by agreement between the members of that society; these signs evoke ideas,
but in that respect it’s rather like rituals, for instance.

Nearly all institutions, it might be said, are based on signs, but these
signs do not directly evoke things. In all societies we find this phenomenon:
that for various purposes systems of signs are established that directly
evoke the ideas one wishes; it is obvious that a language is one such system,
and that it is the most important of them all; but it is not the only one,
and consequently we cannot leave the others out of account. A language
must thus be classed among semiological institutions; for example, ships‘
signals (visual signs), army bugle calls, the sign language of the deaf-and-dumb,
etc. Writing is likewise a vast system of signs. Any psychology of sign
systems will be part of social psychology – that is to say, will be exclusively
social; it will involve the same psychology as is applicable in the case
of languages. The laws governing changes in these systems of signs will
often be significantly similar to laws of linguistic change. This can easily
be seen in the case of writing – although the signs are visual signs –
which undergoes alterations comparable to phonetic phenomena.

Having identified the language as a social product to be studied in
linguistics, one must add that language in humanity as a whole is manifested
in an infinite diversity of languages: a language is the product of a society,
but different societies do not have the same language. Where does this
diversity come from? Sometimes it is a relative diversity, sometimes an
absolute diversity, but we have finally located the concrete object in
this product that can be supposed to be lodged in the brain of each of
us. But this product varies, depending On where you are in the world, what
is given is not only the language but languages. And the linguist has no
other choice than to study initially the diversity of languages. He must
first study languages, as many languages as possible, and widen his horizons
as far as he can. So this is how we shall proceed. From the study and observation
of these languages, the linguist will be able to abstract general features,
retaining everything that seems essential and universal, and setting aside
what is particular and accidental. He will thus end up with a set of abstractions,
which will be the language. That is what is summarised in the second section:
the language. Under ‚the language‘ I shall summarise what can be observed
in the different languages.

3) However, there is still the individual
to be examined, since it is clear that what creates general phenomena is
the collaboration of all the individuals involved. Consequently we have
to take a look at how language operates in the individual. This individual
implementation of the social product is not a part of the object I have
defined. This third chapter reveals, so to speak, what lies underneath
– the individual mechanism, which cannot ultimately fail to have repercussions
in one way or another on the general product, but which must not be confused,
for purposes of study, with that general product, from which it is quite
separate.

[8 November 1910]

Part One: Languages

This heading contrasts with that of my second chapter: the language. There
is no point in giving a more detailed specification and the meaning of
these two contrasting headings is sufficiently self-evident. Just as, although
comparisons with the natural sciences must not be abused, it would likewise
be immediately evident what was meant in a work on natural history by contrasting
‚the plant‘ with ‚plants‘ (c.f. also .’insects, versus ‚the insect‘).

These divisions would correspond reasonably well even in content to
what we shall get in linguistics if we distinguish between ‚the language‘
and ‚languages‘. Some botanists and naturalists devote their entire careers
to one approach or the other. There are botanists who classify plants without
concerning themselves with the circulation of the sap, etc., that is to
say, without concerning themselves with ‚the plant‘.

Considerations relevant to the language (and equally to some extent
to languages as well) will lead us to consider languages from an external
point of view, without making any internal analysis; but the distinction
is not hard and fast, for the detailed study of the history of a language
or of a group of languages is perfectly well accommodated under the heading
‚languages‘, and that presupposes internal analysis. To some extent one
could also say that in my second part ‚the language‘ could be expanded
to read ‚the life of the language‘, that this second part would contain
things of importance for the characterisation of the language, and that
these things are all part of a life, a biology. But there are other things
that would not be included: among others, the whole logical side of the
language, involving invariables unaffected by time or geographical boundaries.
Languages constitute the concrete object that the linguist encounters on
the earth’s surface; ‚the language‘ is the heading one can provide for
whatever generalisations the linguist may be able to extract from all his
observations across time and space.


[30 June 1911]

Reversing the order of the two series I have considered, we can say
that the mind establishes just two orders of relations between words.

1) Outside speech, the association
that is made in the memory between words having something in common creates
different groups, series, families, within which very diverse relations
obtain but belonging to a single category: these are associative relations.

2) Within speech, words are subject
to a kind of relation that is independent of the first and based on their
linkage: these are syntagmatic relations, of which I have spoken.

Here of course there is a problem, because the second order of relations
appears to appeal to facts of speech and not linguistic facts. But the
language itself includes such relations, even if only in compound words
(German Hauptmann), or even in a word like Dummheit, or expressions
like s’il vous plait [‚if you please‘] where a syntagmatic relation
holds.

When we speak of the structure of a word, we are referring to the second
kind of relation: these are units arranged end to end as exponents of certain
relations. If we speak of something like a flexional paradigm (dominus,
domini, domino)
we are referring to a group based on associative relations.
These are not units arranged end to end and related in a certain way in
virtue of that fact.

Magn-animus: the relation involving animus is syntagmatic.
Idea expressed by juxtaposition of the two parts in sequence. Nowhere,
either in magn or in animus do you find something meaning
‚possessing a great soul‘.

If you take animus in relation to anima and animal, it
is a different order of relations. There is an associative family:

 

animus

anima

animal

 

Neither order of relations is reducible to the other: both are operative.

If we compare them to the parts of a building: columns will stand in
a. certain relation to a frieze they support. These two components are
related in a wax which is comparable to the syntagmatic relation. It is
an arrangement of two co-present units. If I see a Doric column, I might
link it by association with a series of objects that are not present, associative
relations (Ionic column, Corinthian column).

The sum total of word relations that the mind associates with any word
that is present gives a virtual series, a series formed by the memory (a
mnemonic series), as opposed to a chain, a syntagma formed by two units
present together. This is an actual series, as opposed to a virtual
series, and gives rise to other relations.

The conclusion I should like to draw from this is as follows:
in whichever order of relations a words functions (it is required to function
in both), a word is always, first and foremost, a member of a system, interconnected
with other words, sometimes in one order of relations, sometimes in another.

This will have to be taken into account in considering what constitutes
value. First, it was necessary to consider words as terms in a system.

As soon as we substitute term for word, this implies consideration
of its relations with others (appeal to the idea of interconnections with
other words).

We must not begin with the word, the term, in order to construct the
system. This would be to suppose that the terms have an absolute value
given in advance, and that you have only to pile them up one on top of
the other in order to reach the system. On the contrary, one must start
from the system, the interconnected whole; this may be decomposed into
particular terms, although these are not so easily distinguished as it
seems. Starting from the whole of the system of values, in order to distinguish
the various values, it is possible that we shall encounter words as recognisable
series of terms. (Incidentally: associatively, I can summon up the word
dominos just as easily as domino, domine, domin-?; syntagmatically,
I have to choose either dominos or domini.)

Attach no importance to the word word. The word word as
far as I am concerned has no specific meaning here. The word term is
sufficient; furthermore, the word word does not mean the same in
the two series.

Chapter V. Value of terms and meanings of words. 
How the two coincide and differ.

Where there are terms, there are also values. The idea of value is tacitly
implied in that of term. Always hard to keep these two ideas apart.

When you speak of value, you feel it here becomes synonymous with
sense (meaning)
and that points to another area of confusion (here
the confusion will reside more in the things themselves).

The value is indeed an element of the sense, but what matters is to
avoid taking the sense as anything other than a value.

It is perhaps one of the most subtle points there is in linguistics,
to see how sense depends on but nevertheless remains distinct from value.
On this the linguist’s view and the simplistic view that sees the language
as a nomenclature differ strikingly.

First let us take meaning as I have represented it and have myself set
it out:

The arrow indicates
meaning as counterpart of the auditory image

In this view, the meaning is the counterpart of the auditory image and
nothing else. The word appears, or is taken as, an isolated, self-contained
whole; internally, it contains the auditory image having a concept as its
counterpart.

The paradox – in Baconian terms the trap in the ‚cave‘ – is this: the
meaning, which appears to us to be the counterpart of the auditory image,
is just as much the counterpart of terms coexisting in the language. We
have just seen that the language represents a system in which all the terms
appear as linked by relations.

At first sight,
no relation between the a) and the b) arrows. The value of
a word will be the result only of the coexistence of the different terms.
The value is the counterpart of the coexisting terms. How does that come
to be confused with the counterpart of the auditory image?

Another diagram: series of slots:

the relation
inside one slot and between slots is very hard to distinguish

The meaning as counterpart of the image and the meaning as counterpart
of coexisting terms merge.

Before example, note that: Outside linguistics, value always seems to
involve the same paradoxical truth. Tricky area. Very difficult in any
domain to say what value consists of. So let us be very wary. There are
two elements comprising value. Value is determined 1)
by a dissimilar thing that can be exchanged, and that can be marked |
[an up-arrow] and 2) by similar things
that can be compared [left-right arrows].

These two elements
are essential for value. For example, a 20-franc coin. Its value is a matter
of a dissimilar thing that I can exchange (e.g. pounds of bread), 2) the
comparison between the 20-franc coin and one-franc and two-franc coins,
etc., or coins of similar value (guinea).

The value is at the same time the counterpart of the one and the counterpart
of the other.

You can never find the meaning of a word by considering only the exchangeable
item, but you have to compare the similar series of comparable words. You
cannot take words in isolation. This is how the system to which the term
belongs is one of the sources of value. It is the sum of comparable terms
set against the idea exchanged.

The value of a word can never be determined except by the contribution
of coexisting terms which delimit it: or, to insist on the paradox already
mentioned: what is in the word is only ever determined by the contribution
of what exists around it. (What is in the word is the value.) Around it
syntagmatically or around it associatively.

You must approach the word from outside by starting from the system
and coexisting terms.

A few examples.

The plural and whatever terms mark the plural.

The value of a German or Latin plural is not the value of a Sanskrit
plural. But the meaning, if you like, is the same.

In Sanskrit, there is the dual.

Anyone who assigns the same value to the Sanskrit plural as to the Latin
plural is mistaken because I cannot use the Sanskrit plural in all the
cases where I use the Latin plural.

Why is that? The value depends on something outside.

If you take on the other hand a simple lexical fact, any word such as,
I suppose, mouton – mutton, it doesn’t have the same value as sheep
in English. For if you speak of the animal on the hoof and not on the table,
you say sheep.

It is the presence in the language of a second term that limits the
value attributable to sheep.

mutton / sheep / mouton (Restrictive example.)

So the | arrow is not enough. The – – arrows must always be taken into
account.

Something similar in the example of decrepit.

How does it come about that an old man who is decrepit and a
wall that is decrepit have a similar sense?

It is the influence of the neighbouring word. What happens to decrepit
(an old man) comes from the coexistence of the neighbouring term decrepit
(a wall).

Example of contagion.

[4 July 1911]

It is not possible even to determine what the value of the word
sun is in itself without considering all the neighbouring words
which will restrict its sense. There are languages in which I can say:
Sit in the sun. In others, not the same meaning for the word
sun (= star). The sense of a term depends on presence or absence
of a neighbouring term.

The system leads to the term and the term to the value. Then you will
see that the meaning is determined by what surrounds it.

I shall also refer back to the preceding chapters, but in the proper
way, via the system, and not starting from the word in isolation.

To get to the notion of value, I have chosen to start from the system
of words as opposed to the word in isolation. I could have chosen a different
basis to start from.

Psychologically, what are our ideas, apart from our language ? They
probably do not exist. Or in a form that may be described as amorphous.
We should probably be unable according to philosophers and linguists to
distinguish two ideas clearly without the help of a language (internal
language naturally).

Consequently, in itself, the purely conceptual mass of our ideas, the
mass separated from the language, is like a kind of shapeless nebula, in
which it is impossible to distinguish anything initially. The same goes,
then, for the language: the different ideas represent nothing pre-existing.
There are no: a) ideas already established
and quite distinct from one another, b)
signs for these ideas. But there is nothing at all distinct in thought
before the linguistic sign. This is the main thing. On the other hand,
it is also worth asking if, beside this entirely indistinct realm of ideas,
the realm of sound offers in advance quite distinct ideas (taken in itself
apart from the idea).

There are no distinct units of sound either, delimited in advance.

The linguistic fact is situated in between the two:

This linguistic fact will engender values which for the first time will
be determinate, but which nevertheless will remain values, in the sense
that can be attached to that word. There is even something to add to the
fact itself, and I come back to it now. Not only are these two domains
between which the linguistic fact is situated amorphous, but the choice
of connection between the two, the marriage (of the two) which will create
value is perfectly arbitrary.

Otherwise the values would be to some extent absolute. If it were not
arbitrary, this idea of value would have to be restricted, there would
be an absolute element.

But since this contract is entirely arbitrary, the values will be entirely
relative.

If we go back now to the diagram representing the signified and signifying
elements together 

we see that it is doubtless justified but is only a secondary product
of value. The signified element alone is nothing, it blurs into a shapeless
mass. Likewise the signifying element.

But the signifying and signified elements contract a bond in virtue
of the determinate values that are engendered by the combination of such
and such acoustic signs with such and such cuts that can be made in the
mass. What would have to be the case in order to have this relation between
signified and signifying elements given in itself ? It would above all
be necessary that the idea should be determinate in advance, and it is
not. It would above all be necessary that the signified element should
be something determined in advance, and it is not.

That is why this relation is only another expression of values in contrast
(in the system). That is true on any linguistic level.

A few examples. If ideas were predetermined in the human mind
before being linguistic values, one thing that would necessarily happen
is that terms would correspond exactly as between one language and another.


French German
cher [‚dear‘] lieb, teuer (also moral)
There is no exact correspondence.
juger, estimer

[‚judge, estimate‘]
urteilen, erachten

have a set of meanings only partly coinciding with French juger,
estimer .

We see that in advance of the language there is nothing which is the
notion ‚cher‘ in itself. So we see that this representation: 
although useful, is only a way of expressing the fact that there is in
French a certain value cher delimited in French system by contrast with
other terms.

It will be a certain combination of a certain quantity of concepts with
a certain quantity of sounds.

So the schema 
is not the starting point in the language.

The value cher is determined on both sides. The contours of the
idea itself is what we are given by the distribution of ideas in the words
of a language. Once we have the contours, the schema can come into play. 

This example was taken from vocabulary, but anything will do.

Another example. Idea of different tenses, which seems quite natural
to us, is quite alien to certain languages. As in the Semitic system (Hebrew)
there is no distinction, as between present, future and past; that is to
say these ideas of tense are not predetermined, but exist only as values
in one language or another.

Old German has no future, no proper form for the future. It expresses
it by means of the present. But this is a manner, of speaking. Hence Old
German present value is not the same as in French future.

Similarly if we take the difference between the perfective aspect of
the verb and the imperfective aspect in the Slavic languages (difficulty
in the study of these languages). In Slavic languages, constant distinction
between aspects of the verb: action outside any question of time or in
process of accomplishment. We find these distinctions difficult because
the categories are unfamiliar. So not predetermined, but value.

This value will result from the opposition of terms in the language.

Hence what I have just said: The notion of value was deduced from the
indeterminacy of concepts. The schema linking the signified to the signifying
element is not a primary schema. Value cannot be determined by the linguist
any more than in other domains: we take it with all its clarity and obscurity.

To sum up, the word does not exist without a signified as well as a
signifying element. But the signified element is only a summary of the
linguistic value, presupposing the mutual interaction of terms, in each
language system.

Chapter

In a later chapter, if I have time: What I have said by focussing on the
term value can be alternatively expressed by laying down the following
principle: in the language (that is, a language state) there are only differences.
Difference implies to our mind two positive terms between which the difference
is established. But the paradox is that: In the language, there are only
differences, without positive terms. That is the paradoxical truth. At
least, there are only differences if you are speaking either of meanings,
or of signified or signifying elements.

When you come to the terms themselves, resulting from relations between
signifying and signified elements you can speak of oppositions.

Strictly speaking there are no signs but differences between signs.

Example in Czech: zhena, ‚woman‘; genitive plural, zhen.

It is clear that in the language one sign is as good as another. Here
there is none.

(zhena, zhen functions as well as zhena, gen. pl. zhenu
which existed previously.)

[This example shows that only the difference between signs is operative.

zhenu works because it is different from zhena.

zhen works because it is different from zhena.

There are only differences; no positive term at all.

Here I am speaking of a difference in the signifying element.

The mechanism of signifying elements is based on differences.

Likewise for signified elements, there are only differences that will
be governed by differences of an acoustic nature. The idea of a future
will exist more or less, depending on whether the differences established
by signs of the language (between the future and the rest) are more or
less marked.

Aller [‚to go‘] functions because it is different from allant
[‚going‘] and allons [‚(we) go‘].

aller | allons | allant

English going = aller, allant

Unsegmented, given no acoustic difference between two ideas, the ideas
themselves will not be differentiated, at any rate as much as in French.

So the whole language system can be envisaged as sound differences combined
with differences between ideas.

There are no positive ideas given, and there are no determinate acoustic
signs that are independent of ideas. Thanks to the fact that the differences
are mutually dependent, we shall get something looking like positive terms
through the matching of a certain difference of ideas with a certain difference
in signs. We shall then be able to speak of the opposition of terms and
so not claim that there are only differences (because of this positive
element in the combination).

In the end, the principle it comes down to is the fundamental principle
of the arbitrariness of the sign.

It is only through the differences between signs that it will be possible
to give them a function, a value.

If the sign were not arbitrary, one would not be able to say that in
the language there are only differences.

The link with the chapter entitled Absolute arbitrariness, relative
arbitrariness is this: I have considered the word as a term placed
in a system, that is to say as a value. Now the interconnection of terms
in the system can be conceived as a limitation on arbitrariness, whether
through syntagmatic interconnection or associative interconnection.

So: In couperet syntagma between root and suffix, as opposed
to hache.

(Interconnection, syntagmatic link between the two elements.)

Hache [‚axe‘] is absolutely arbitrary, couperet [‚chopper‘]
is relatively motivated (syntagmatic association with coupe [‚chop‘]),

couperet 

hache 
syntagmatic limitation absolutely arbitrary.
plu [‚pleased‘] 

plaire [‚to please‘] 
associative limitation

In this course only the external part is more or less complete.

In the internal part, evolutionary linguistics has been neglected
in favour of synchronic linguistics and I have dealt only with a few general
principles of linguistics.

These general principles provide the basis for a productive approach
to the details of a static state or the law of static states.

o
Nichole Kydreos on The Killer  Inside Me  – a Derridean Reading

Suspense
Fiction


Another
Scene